Support for “Islamic State” in Indonesian prisons by Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict
  






II. Indonesian Prisons and “Islamic State” ............................................2
III. Pasir Putih Prison ...............................................................................3
 A. The First Inmates ..........................................................................4
 B. New Arrivals .................................................................................5
 C. Syria Becomes an Issue ................................................................7
 D. Analysis of Networks .................................................................10
IV. Support for IS in Kembang Kuning ................................................11
 A. Aman Abdurrahman vs. Toni Togar ........................................11
 B. Analysis of Networks .................................................................14
V. Prison Networks and Travel to Syria  .............................................15
 A. Getting Approved by IS .............................................................15
 B. Finding a Separate Path to Syria ...............................................16
 C. Organisational Affiliation Not a Reliable Guide ....................16
 D. Prisoner Releases and Possible Departures to Syria ..............17
VI. What the Government Can Do .......................................................18 
 A. The Prisons ..................................................................................18
 B. Police ............................................................................................19
 C. The Need for Legislation ...........................................................20
VII. Conclusion .........................................................................................20
Appendix A:
 Distribution of Convicted Terrorists ..............................................21
Appendix B:
 Extremist Prisoners Released in 2013-2014 ..................................22
Support for “Islamic State” in Indonesian Prisons ©2015 IPAC             1
I .   INTRODUCTION
A study of networks in Indonesian prisons that support the Islamic State (IS) suggests that 
relatively simple interventions by prison officials may be able to limit the influence of hardline 
ideologues. Only a minority of those convicted of terrorism in Indonesia support IS openly, and 
there is nothing to suggest that their numbers are increasing. If anything, they are declining. 
The need to understand the dynamics of prison networks is still urgent, however, because pro-
IS inmates can constitute key nodes for encouraging or facilitating travel to Syria and because 
those who support IS generally support the use of violence at home.1 Preventing the growth of 
IS influence in prisons is therefore a way of reducing the security threat more generally.
Indonesian officials are well aware of the problem, and there have been noticeable improve-
ments in supervision of extremist inmates. The challenges are huge, however, and resources 
are limited. It may be time to take another look at donor assistance in a way that would avoid 
some of the problems that have plagued past efforts and see if there is a way to encourage local 
initiatives, locally developed. Indonesia also needs to adopt a law that would make it a crime to 
travel abroad to join or assist foreign terrorist organisations, although some makeshift solutions 
are planned that would draw on existing provisions of the Criminal Code. Without such a ban, 
however, the triangular link between prisons, extremist groups and groups like IS will persist. 
After the announcement on 29 June 2014 that the organisation called Islamic State of Iraq 
and Greater Syria (ISIS) had changed its name to Islamic State and declared its leader to be the 
caliph of all Muslims, ceremonies to pledge loyalty took place in jihadi communities around 
Indonesia, including in several prisons. The most publicised of these ceremonies took place in 
Pasir Putih Prison, a “super maximum security” facility on the island of Nusakambangan off the 
southern coast of Java, where 24 prisoners, including Indonesia’s best known extremist cleric, 
Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, swore allegiance on 2 July 2014.
This report examines the process by which inmates in two prisons in the Nusakambangan 
complex, Pasir Putih and Kembang Kuning, chose sides after IS was established. For some, 
choosing for or against was a question of principle, but for many, more personal and pragmatic 
interests came into the calculus, such as access to extra food. The most militant inmates often 
have the best supply networks, with donations and contributions coming in on a regular basis 
through visitors. If that supply dries up, a leader’s hold on his followers can weaken, as Ba’asyir 
found when his organisation, Jamaah Anshorul Tauhid (JAT), splintered as a result of his oath 
to IS. When JAT members stopped sending extra provisions, the less ideologically inclined of 
Ba’asyir’s followers were willing to align with whoever could fill the gap.
For many of the extremists, separation from their families and particularly from their chil-
dren is the hardest part of incarceration, and desire for contact can be a powerful incentive for 
cooperation. Personal feuds are also important. On the principle of “the enemy of my enemy is 
my friend”, some inmates joined the IS camp because they had a dispute with someone who was 
anti-IS. Again, it is critically important for prison officials to try to understand who is on the 
outs with whom over what, so they can assess the consequences and use it to their advantage.
Differences over points of theology and doctrine do of course take place—one of most heated 
is between takfir mu’ayyan and takfir am, basically whether one brands individuals as nonbe-
lievers (kafir) by virtue of their membership in a group or on the basis of their own misdeeds. 
The IS supporters are proponents of takfir mu’ayyan and thus see all agents of state, including 
police and prison officials, as enemies. But while such ideological convictions are deeply held by 
a few, many in the pro-IS camp have only a weak grasp of doctrine and their decision to join was 
1 Throughout this report, we use “IS” in reference to the entity that emerged after the declaration of the caliphate on 29 June 
2014 and “ISIS” to the organisation that existed up to that point. 
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influenced by more mundane factors.
The Nusakambangan case studies show how alliances can change as the result of the arrival 
of new inmates, a fight, or a change in government policy. Prison officials need to understand 
the circumstances that can lead to solidarity among inmates in the face of a perceived threat or 
the break-up of once-solid friendships. And crucially, they need to realise that no matter how 
well they understand individuals and alliances in prison, everything can change once a prisoner 
is released. 
II .  INDONESIAN PRISONS AND “ISLAMIC STATE”
Across Indonesia, 26 prisons run by the Corrections Directorate of the Ministry of Law and 
Human Rights house some 270 convicted terrorists (See Appendix A); the number is constantly 
changing as new inmates come in and others are released.2 As of January 2015, an additional 
90 terrorist suspects, on trial or in pre-trial detention, were in police custody in the detention 
facility at the paramilitary police (Brigade Mobil, Brimob) command in Kelapa Dua, Depok, a 
Jakarta suburb. Since the conviction rate of suspected terrorists in Indonesia is almost 100 per 
cent, virtually all of these people will end up serving their sentences in one or several of the 26 
prisons above; most will be transferred at least once before their terms are over. In addition, a 
handful of known jihadis have been charged under Emergency Law 12/1951, banning the pos-
session or transfer of explosives and other weapons, rather than the terrorism law and so do not 
appear on any official lists.
IS supporters constitute a small minority among incarcerated extremists, and there is no ev-
idence that their ranks are increasing.3 If anything, they are decreasing as a few of the less com-
mitted have second thoughts or are pulled away by interventions of friends, family or officials. 
But the hard core remains a serious problem, and as prison staff and police are well aware, most 
maintain links to groups outside, including those facilitating travel to Syria. Even a single pro-IS 
inmate can be a problem if he has the seniority and legitimacy to influence followers through 
communications by cell phone or discussions with visitors. While pro-IS inmates are all men, 
support among some of the wives may be no less strong, and the women continue to play a crit-
ical role as couriers and in some cases, propagandists via social media. 
Even before IS was declared, the Syrian conflict had attracted great interest in the jihadi 
community. 4 As the rift between ISIS and the al-Qaeda-linked al-Nusra Front deepened in late 
2013, many extremist inmates took sides, with followers of Aman Abdurrahman generally sup-
porting IS and those affiliated with Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) generally supporting al-Nusra. The 
former tend to also support violent jihad in Indonesia, while JI since 2007 has rejected violence 
at home as counterproductive. After the caliphate was announced, some of the more militant 
inmates pledged loyalty in ceremonies that largely went unnoticed until late July 2014 when the 
government became exercised by a IS recruiting video urging Indonesians to join. Until that 
point, there was little understanding in the prison system about what ISIS or IS was, let alone 
recognition that it might have implications for Indonesia. Only after 4 August, when the govern-
ment banned IS activities, did prison authorities begin to look more closely at support among 
the inmates under their control.
As far as we know, actual oath-taking ceremonies took place at only two prisons—Pasir Putih 
2 A list from July 2014 includes 27 prisons with convicted terrorists, for example, but the handful held in the West Sulawesi 
prison have all been since released. 
3 IS supporters constitute only two out of 15 convicted terrorists in Porong prison, for example, who support IS and only 
four out of 28 in Cipinang.
4 See IPAC Report No. 13, The Evolution of ISIS in Indonesia, 24 September 2014 and IPAC Report No. 6, Indonesians and the 
Syrian Conflict, 30 January 2014.
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and Kembang Kuning on Nusakambangan—and at the Brimob detention facility in Kelapa Dua, 
but support for IS among inmates has surfaced elsewhere. Tangerang Prison, for example, has 
been a particular problem, and prison officials have tried to move some of the ringleaders out, 
but when certain individuals have shown an ability to recruit, finding a new location for them is 
not always easy: prison authorities need to consider whether they will strengthen hardline ranks 
in prisons with segregated terrorist blocks; radicalise inmates in places where extremists and 
ordinary criminal offenders share space; or outwit prison personnel in places lacking sufficient 
personnel for intensive monitoring. 
On 5 August, the Corrections Directorate issued a detailed set of instructions for preventing 
IS influence in prisons, but except for a directive to confiscate ISIS paraphenelia, there were no 
clear guidelines on what to watch for. Later it transpired that some lower-ranking prison person-
nel had detailed knowledge of discussions among inmates and their visitors about going to Syria 
to fight, but none of their superiors had ever expressed interest in the subject and there were no 
established channels for reporting the information. There was also no mechanism for keeping 
prison authorities apprised of key developments, international and domestic, that might have 
ramifications for extremist inmates.
When a photo of the oath-taking ceremony at Pasir Putih involving Ba’asyir emerged, em-
barrassed prison officials said they had not known about it because they normally did not enter 
the prayer room where it was held.5 One would think that of all places, the prayer room of a 
terrorist block in a super maximum security prison would be one to monitor closely, but the 
extremists had basically declared it off-limits to prison personnel, and the intimidation worked. 
Supervision throughout the system has since improved somewhat, but lack of sufficient trained 
personnel is still a huge problem.
The two case studies below illustrate how IS support evolved and some of the dilemmas pris-
on officials face in confronting it.
III .   PASIR PUTIH PRISON
Pasir Putih is the “super maximum security” facility in the Nusakambangan complex.6 As plans 
have been put on hold to move convicted terrorists to a newly constructed prison in Sentul, out-
side Jakarta, Pasir Putih seems to be moving slowly toward becoming a terrorists-only facility, 
with some of the narcotics and other offenders being moved to other prisons in the complex. 
It provides a particularly interesting case study of the dynamics among jihadi inmates for 
several reasons. One is the presence of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, serving a fifteen-year sentence for 
terrorism.7 While his influence has declined somewhat in jihadi circles, he is still very much the 
elder statesman of the movement. He is rarely the initiator of actions, but what he says and does 
carries weight, so every faction wants him on side, in the belief that he can pull more people 
in. A second reason is the sharp increase in the numbers of convicted terrorists held, from nine 
in early 2013 to 42 as of December 2014. A third is the way that refusal to cooperate in prison 
5 “Menkumham Akui Baasyir Baiat Napi di Lapas untuk Ikut ISIS”, Republika, 4 August 2014.
6 Pasir Putih began operating in 2007. Initially it was mainly used for criminals sentenced to life imprisonment or death 
and for serious narcotics offenders, including foreigners. It only began taking convicted terrorists in January 2013 after 
the Central Java provincial office of Law and Human Rights Ministry made a decision to make it the showcase for terrorist 
rehabilitation. As of late October 2014, according to Corrections Directorate data, it housed 291 prisoners including 42 
convicted terrorists. It is one of the few prisons that is not overcrowded, since its official capacity is 336.
7 Ba’asyir was arrested in August 2010 for raising funds for the Aceh training camp that police broke up in February 2010. 
He had been arrested before in October 2002 in connection with the Bali bombing but prosecutors could not make the 
major charges against him stick and he was finally sentenced to 18 months for minor immigration violations. On the day 
he was to be released in April 2004, he was rearrested and sentenced to 30 months on terrorism charges. He was released 
in June 2006. 
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activities became a necessary but not sufficient condition for moving on to IS support. The “un-
cooperative” prisoners were unquestionably hardliners but many initially stayed neutral on IS. 
This “undecided” group became the sought-after prize by both the pro- and anti-ISIS factions.
A. The First Inmates
Pasir Putih’s first set of terrorist inmates have played a key role in the subsequent development 
of the factions, in part because in prisons as in other institutions, seniority counts.8 They also 
had a chance to bond before they were swamped with new arrivals in November 2013. From 
the beginning, these inmates were isolated in Block D, one of four blocks in the prison, and had 
limited interaction with ordinary criminal offenders. They included the following:
Abdurrahim bin Thoyib alias Abu Husna. One of the original JI members, Abu Husna had 
been arrested in Malaysia in January 2008, trying to get to Damascus on a false passport, 
long before the Syrian conflict erupted. He was trying to flee the country after arrests of other 
top JI leaders in 2007. Abu Husna has a classic JI profile: he studied at Ba’asyir’s pesantren in 
Ngruki, Solo, taught there for years, and took a four-month training course at JI’s Camp Hu-
daibiyah in central Mindanao in 1999. He was never himself directly involved in violence. He 
was moved to Nusakambangan after being tried and sentenced to nine years in 2009 – and if 
standard remissions policies were followed (which they will not be, given his behavior), this 
would make him eligible for conditional release this year. When Ba’asyir was moved to Pasir 
Putih in 2013, Abu Husna became his de facto personal adviser. If Abu Husna fit the profile of 
fellow JI leaders arrested around the same time, one would have expected him to be relatively 
cooperative with prison authorities and initially, he seemed to be heading in that direction. A 
series of incidents turned him instead into one of IS’s strongest supporters. 
Qomarudin alias Mustaqim alias Abu Yusuf. Abu Jusuf was another longtime JI member 
from Lampung who broke with JI in 2009 over what he saw as its abandonment of jihad and 
helped plan the terrorist training camp in Aceh under the leadership of Bali bomber Dulma-
tin that was broken up in early 2010. He had served briefly as head of Camp Hudaibiyah in 
Mindanao in 1998 and before that had taught at the school that until 2001 served as JI’s nerve 
center in Malaysia, Pesantren Lukman al-Hakiem. For his role in the Aceh camp, he was sen-
tenced to ten years in early 2011. He became a strong IS supporter.
Dzulkifli Lubis alias Abu Irhab. A dealer in airsoft guns, Abu Irhab was arrested in 2011 for 
selling a pistol to the man responsible for the suicide bombing of the Cirebon police mosque. 
He also was friends with Sofyan Tsauri, one of the key figures responsible for the Aceh train-
ing camp, though played no role in the camp itself. More importantly, he had been a follower 
of Aman Abdurrahman since 2009. He was sentenced to eight years and transferred to Pasir 
Putih in January 2013 where he became a strong IS supporter. 
Aryanto Haluto. A JAT member, he was arrested for the 25 May 2011 shooting of two police-
men in Palu, the first major operation of the group led by Santoso that later came to be known 
as the Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT). He was arrested the same day and later sentenced 
to eleven years. He became one of the committed members of the pro-IS group.
Hari Kuncoro alias Uceng. Married to Dulmatin’s sister, Hari Kuncoro was a member of 
KOMPAK going back to the early days of the Ambon conflict. He had a long record of in-
volvement in terrorist activities and six years (2003-2009) in Mindanao, first with the MILF, 
then with Abu Sayyaf; he returned to Indonesia with Umar Patek, the Bali bomber, in 2009. 
8 Five arrived in late 2012, but one, Abdullah Sunata, was transferred to Batu Prison on Nusakambangan when Ba’asyir ar-
rived on 15 January 2013. (He and Ba’asyir effectively switched places.) The others arrived a week later on 22 January.
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With that background, he might have been predicted to be one of the early IS supporters. In 
fact, he stayed neutral for a long time and eventually came out against it. 
Ahmad Izmi alias Adam. A Darul Islam (DI) veteran, he was arrested in July 2011 in con-
nection with trying to smuggle a few firearms purchased in Mindanao for the DI faction led 
by Abu Umar. He was sentenced to six years, meaning if standard remissions apply—and they 
may in his case—he could be released this year. He became one of the most vocal critics of IS 
in Pasir Putih.
Amri Firmansyah alias Ali Miftah. Amri, released in December 2014, was another strong 
IS opponent. Married to Dulmatin’s wife’s younger sister, he had been active in the JI com-
munity in Solo ever since his enrollment in Darusyahada, the JI school in Boyolali, Solo. He 
became involved in the Aceh training camp largely through his closeness to a Darusyahada 
classmate who was active in JAT. He was arrested in 2011 and later sentenced to five years. 
All of the above were reasonably cooperative at first, polite to prison officials and willing to 
participate in programs. This situation changed in June 2013 when a regulation issued in late 
2012 by the Ministry of Law and Human Rights began to be implemented. Regulation 99/2012 
was designed to tighten remission and release procedures for serious offenders, including ter-
rorists.9 If they wished to receive sentence reductions, convicted terrorists would have to express 
remorse for crimes committed, take part in a deradicalisation program, become “justice collab-
orators” and assist the police in solving outstanding terrorism cases, and sign an oath of loyalty 
to Pancasila and the Unitary State of Indonesia (NKRI). 
On 29 June 2013, Ba’asyir released a statement from prison, castigating Regulation 99 and 
saying anyone willing to accept the conditions should be considered apostate.10 Aman Abdu-
rrahman did the same from Kembang Kuning Prison.
As anger over Regulation 99 grew, several of the extremists in Pasir Putih became hostile 
toward the prison staff and stopped attending programs. These included Ba’asyir, Abu Husna, 
Abu Yusuf and Abu Irhab. Abu Husna was already irritated at the staff for other reasons. In 
2012, he had secured the desirable position of tamping mesjid, where he was employed by the 
prison mosque and held Arabic language classes on the side, including for ordinary criminal 
offenders.11 He was fired after prison authorities found that he was not just teaching language 
but indoctrinating some of his students with radical ideology. To then be told that he would 
have to become a “justice collaborator” to receive remissions, in his view, was adding insult to 
injury.12 Had prison authorities dealt with Abu Husna differently from the outset, he might not 
have joined the hardliners so quickly and also might have been able to keep Ba’asyir neutral on 
IS. He never should have been given a tamping job in the first place, but there may have been 
other ways his status could have been acknowledged and his skills as a scholar and linguist put 
to constructive—and tightly supervised—use. 
B. New Arrivals
In August 2013, six convicted terrorists were among a group of 22 prisoners sent to Nusakam-
bangan from Tanjung Gusta, the major prison in Medan, North Sumatra that was burned down 
9 See IPAC Report No.2, Prison Problems: Planned and Unplanned Released of Convicted Extremists in Indonesia, 2 Septem-
ber 2013, Section IV.
10 Ibid, p.9.
11 A tamping is an inmate chosen as an assistant to a pemuka, another inmate given a supervisory role in prison. A tamping 
mesjid generally escorts prisoners from their cells to the mosque for Friday prayers, among other duties. An inmate in 
a tamping role can often employ up to five other prisoners. Inmates in these jobs have access to cash and to additional 
privileges, including sentence reductions.
12 IPAC interviews, Pasir Putih, October 2014.
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by rioting inmates a month earlier. The grievances that led to the riot included unhappiness over 
Regulation 99. Four of the six, including the inmates’ spokesman, Wak Geng, were moved into 
Pasir Putih. Wak Geng had emerged as a leader during the riot and managed to bring the rioters 
under control in exchange for discussions with senior government officials, after which they 
agreed the regulation would not be applied retroactively. The whole country had been watch-
ing as the incident unfolded, and Wak Geng came to Pasir Putih with real authority among the 
extremists, despite the lack of any deep commitment to jihadism.13 He subsequently became a 
leader of the anti-IS group, while the other three transferred from Medan strongly supported 
the new caliphate.
By the end of 2013, Abu Husna, Abu Yusuf and Abu Irhab were completely in the hardline, 
uncooperative camp. They got reinforcement from some of the 30 new inmates who arrived in 
October and November 2013. Among them were several who had been influenced by Aman 
Abdurrahman, including Ahmad Widodo alias Abu Hanifah, who had developed his own small 
group of would-be bombers in the Solo area; Awalludin Nasir, from a DI faction in Makassar 
that in 2012 tried to bomb the convoy of the candidate for governor of South Sulawesi (later 
elected); and Ismet Hakiki alias Sapta Syailendra from Ring Banten, another DI faction.14 Sapta, 
who had taken part in the Aceh camp, had been known as an intractable hardliner while de-
tained in a prison in Tangerang, so Pasir Putih authorities knew he would likely be trouble. 
The militancy of the uncooperative prisoners increased with their new allies, and they began 
to influence others. Most of the new inmates refused to pray in the prison mosque, accusing it 
of being a masjid dhirar, or a mosque used for unIslamic purposes. They refused to greet prison 
personnel on the grounds that they were kafir. Every afternoon they had a show of force, prac-
ticing martial arts in the soccer field, with Sapta from Ring Banten as their trainer. 
They became even more united on 12 December 2013 after a fight broke out in the course of 
a soccer match between the terrorists from Block D and a team of criminal offenders. A fight 
broke out between Beben Khairul Rizal, one of the August arrivals, with Chandra Murti Pra-
bowo, a criminal inmate.15 Inmates supporting the respective teams began trading insults, then 
one of the criminal convicts named Merianto went on to the field and accused Beben of fouling. 
Without warning, Abu Irhab knocked Merianto down with a blow to the head and another on 
the terrorist team kicked him after he had fallen. The criminals then went after the terrorists. 
Prison officials managed to separate the two sides, but suddenly Sapta shouted “Allahu Akbar!” 
One of the criminals shouted back an obscenity. The fight led to a tightening of ranks among the 
extremists. 
Four days later, in a completely unrelated incident, prison staff confiscated some boxing 
gloves that someone had sent prisoners in Block D. Dozens of angry inmates surrounded the 
head of prison security and demanded that the gloves be turned over, threatening to disrupt the 
prison if they were not. Eventually Ba’asyir was called to bring them under control, which he did 
by scolding them for getting so upset over something as worldly as a pair of gloves.
The series of incidents turned sent many of the once-cooperative prisoners into non-cooper-
ators who rejected prison programs. Again, it is worth underscoring that none of these trigger-
13 Wak Geng had been involved in the August 2010 robbery of the CIMB Niaga bank in Medan, in which some fugitives from 
the Aceh training camp also took part. He said he took part primarily to get a share of the proceeds. He had no real jihadi 
past but had served as part of the security detail for Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) when Abu Bakar Ba’asyir visited 
Medan earlier in 2010.
14 All these DI factions have a common ancestry and occasionally intersected during the conflicts in Ambon and Poso and 
in a Mindanao training camp, especially in the period 1999-2001, but they developed as distinct groups with independent 
leadership structures. See Solahudin, The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia, Singapore, 2013.
15 Beben Khairul Reza, born in Majalengka but long resident in Lampung and a graduate of a JI school there, had served as 
deputy to Ali Miftah in recruiting participants for the Aceh camp. He subsequently took part in the robbery of the CIMB 
Niaga bank with Wak Geng and others.
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ing incidents were religious or ideological in nature, and some of the inmates became hostile to 
the prison staff because of their own feelings of being ill-used, not because of recruitment efforts 
by the hardliners. Nonetheless, the hardliners were happy to get the support.
Among the few who remained willing to work with prison authorities were Adam and Ali 
Miftah, who shared a cell. It was not that they suddenly saw the light and decided to disen-
gage. Rather, they considered imprisonment to be an emergency situation in which cooperation 
with oppressors was legitimate as a form of self-protection.16 Their stance, however, irritated the 
hardliners who accused them of working for intelligence and falling victim to deradicalisation. 
At one point in 2013, a paper was taped to the door of their cell with the message, “Beware, 
Spies”. The two were mostly ostracised, though not by all; Wak Geng, for example, stayed friends 
with them. Adam had been the cook for Block D, a highly sought after position because of the 
ability to allocate special portions. He was removed from the job. The two were no longer given 
shares of donated food. At the time, the hardliners were relatively well off, with donations from 
JAT, GASHIBU (a charity that became pro-IS) and other sympathisers, giving them a stock of 
food supplies that was the envy of other prisoners. 
C. Syria Becomes an Issue
By late 2013, the issue of ISIS vs. al-Nusra in Syria had become a hot topic in Pasir Putih. The 
Block D inmates who had been influenced by Aman Abdurrahman, including Abu Irhab, Beben 
Khairul Rizal, Abu Yusuf and Sapta, became committed ISIS supporters. They tried to influence 
other prisoners by distributing Aman’s translations of pro-ISIS materials. Abu Yusuf and his 
friends then made a kind of “wall magazine”, pasting the tracts on the walls of the block. Prison 
authorities made no effort to remove it.
These inmates made a special effort to influence the senior figures such as Abu Umar, Abu 
Husna and especially Ba’asyir so that there would be a follow-on effect outside prison. If they 
could bring Ba’asyir over to the pro-ISIS side, then maybe all JAT members and other admirers 
would follow. Interestingly, Abu Umar, the leader of a Darul Islam faction with links to Sabah, 
Malaysia and the southern Philippines, who might have been predicted to be among the most 
militant, was not ready to commit himself. 
It was a more pressing issue within JAT. In early 2014 JAT was struggling with the rifts among 
jihadi groups in Syria. Some JAT leaders such as Afif Abdul Madjid and Abu Fida clearly sup-
ported ISIS. Afif Abdul Madjid himself had gone to Syria for a month, from mid-December 
2013 to mid-January 2014 and on 3 January had sworn an oath of loyalty to ISIS leader al-Bagh-
dadi after taking part in a military training course. Others, like Fuad al-Hazimi, and Ba’asyir’s 
own son, Abdurrahim, supported al-Nusra. 
On March 2014 Abu Bakar Ba’asyir released a letter in Arabic to Indonesian mujahidin in 
Syria, urging them to stay united and saying “I do not want to become trapped defending one 
side and attacking the other, as some leaders and activists are doing. Because I am not there with 
you, I cannot evaluate who is right. Therefore I urge you to carry out jihad as a united body un-
der a single command; do not go off and wage war on your own.”17 
Even if he felt he could not choose between the two jihadi sides, the ISIS supporters in Pasir 
Putih lost no opportunity to try and win him over. Their strategy was to attach themselves to 
Ba’asyir and follow him wherever he went. They bombarded him with pro-ISIS articles and tried 
to engage him in intensive discussion. They argued, for example, that ISIS was not just a state in 
16 This was a common argument among jihadi prisoners who believed deception was a useful tactic to ensure early release so 
they could return to jihad. They cited the example of Amar bin Yasir, a Companion of the Prophet, who pretended he was 
a kafir when his own life was threatened. 
17 “Seruan Ust. Abu Bakar Ba’asyir Kepada Mujahidin di Bumi Syam”, ansharuttauhid.com, 10 March 2014.
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name only but also had the attributes of one because it controlled territory and strictly applied 
Islamic law. They also tried to convince Ba’asyir that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was a legitimate 
commander because he held a doctorate in Islamic law, and was both experienced in war and a 
descendant of the Prophet. 
Aman Abdurrahman also frequently telephoned Ba’asyir on his mobile phone—in the super 
maximum security prison that was supposed to have jammers for cell phone communications—
to engage him in discussion and explain why the criticism of ISIS from respected ulama was 
wrong. The same methods were used on Abu Husna, because he was so close to Ba’asyir. 
These tactics worried JAT leaders and Ba’asyir’s family because the ISIS group stuck to him 
like leeches even when he had family visits, so that whenever the subject of ISIS came up, some-
one was always there to defend it. They asked the help of Hari Kuncoro to stay Ba’asyir and help 
get him away from the Aman crowd. But Hari’s religious knowledge was not up to the task, and 
he always lost debates with the pro-ISIS inmates. JAT eventually gave up—they could not ar-
range to have someone accompany Ba’asyir around the clock from inside and they themselves 
could only visit every two weeks. 
By the end of May 2014, the efforts of the ISIS supporters were beginning to pay off. First they 
persuaded Abu Husna to join, and those who studied with him in Block D followed suit. (He 
was no longer allowed to teach in the mosque but prison officials believed they could not inter-
vene as long as he held classes only within the terrorist block itself.) His students included four 
prisoners from Aceh from the former rebel group, GAM, who had no previous jihadi affiliation 
but were rather arrested for carrying out political murders on behalf of the GAM-linked Aceh 
Party (Partai Aceh) before the 2012 election for governor—and also plotting to kill the then in-
cumbent governor, Irwandi Yusuf.18 
With Abu Husna’s acceptance, Ba’asyir’s capitulation was a matter of time because the two 
were so close. By early June, the pro-ISIS group were convinced they had succeeded. On 3 June, 
a journalist from the pro-ISIS website, www.al-mustaqbal.net, went to Pasir Putih to interview 
Ba’asyir, planning to post an announcement of his allegiance on the website when they were 
through.19
The Ba’asyir family and JAT got wind of the plan, however, so on the same day, JAT leaders 
M. Achwan and Fuad al-Hazimi rushed to Pasir Putih and met Ba’asyir for almost an hour, 
urging him not to rush into any decision. As a result, Ba’asyir changed his mind again and told 
the journalist that he was still studying whether ISIS met the requirements under Islamic law to 
form a state.20
Ba’asyir’s hesitation disappointed the hardliners who tried to point out that several provinces 
in Iraq, including Fallujah and Ramadi, were already applying Islamic law. It took the fall of Mo-
sul, quickly followed by other cities in June 2014, to finally persuade the elderly cleric. Ba’asyir 
was caught up in the euphoria that these victories produced among the Block D inmates. On 16 
June, all the ISIS supporters including Ba’asyir held special prayers to give thanks in the Block D 
prayer room, with Abu Husna acting as imam. Ba’asyir circulated a statement in prison, urging 
any Indonesians who could to “leave for the battlefields of Iraq and Sham to help your brothers 
there, with the help of Allah, to strengthen the forces of the Islamic State and be victorious in 
18 These four and others involved in the same plot now detained in other prisons are the only insurgents or former insurgents 
currently serving time in prison on terrorism charges.
19 For a discussion of al-mustaqbal.net’s involvement in dissemination of ISIS propaganda, see IPAC, “The Evolution of ISIS 
in Indonesia”, op. cit. 
20 “Wawancara Eksklusif Dengan Ustadz ABB; Tetapi Kita Tetap Mendukung ISIS”, www.al-mustaqbal.net, 4 June 2014. 
Ba’asyir said the conditions for a true Islamic state were whether it applied Islamic law purely and fully and he was still un-
able to say for sure. “The news is confusing about the extent of ISIS control in Syria and Iraq,” he said. “So we’re still studying 
whether the state is really a state. If it is, we are obliged to support it.”
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battles against the international kafir alliance.”21 
The euphoria grew with the announcement on 29 June 2014 (1 Ramadan) by al-Baghdadi 
declaring himself caliph of a new Islamic State. Three days later, on 2 July, Ba’asyir and 23 other 
ISIS supporters took an oath of allegiance to the IS and the caliph in the Block D prayer room.22 
An ISIS flag was smuggled in for the occasion by the wives of one of the inmates, wearing it 
inside out as a headscarf. 
Ba’asyir’s oath led to the splintering of JAT, with Ba’asyir refusing to have anyone question 
his authority and sacking M. Achwan and Fuad al-Hazimi because they did. The dissidents in 
JAT, which by one estimate included 90 per cent of the organization, left and set up a new group, 
Jamaah Anshorul Syariah (JAS).23 
In the end, Ba’asyir’s decision to take the oath did not bring in as many others as the hardcore 
IS group had hoped. Several key figures among the undecided were not swayed by Ba’asyir’s ac-
tion, Abu Umar among them. Those who stayed adamantly opposed to IS included Wak Geng, 
Hari Kuncoro and others. Many were alienated by the aggressive tactics of the IS supporters and 
their criticism of leading IS critics such as Ayman al-Zawahiri, Muhammad al-Maqdisi, and 
Abu Qatadah al-Filistini. “Who are they to suggest someone of Ayman al-Zawahiri’s experience 
is deviant?” said one who declined to join.24 The IS doubters began to show their unhappiness 
with the hardliners by resuming participation in prison programs.
Some among the hardliners, such as the Cirebon prisoner Nang Ndut, had actually wanted to 
cooperate because they wanted early release, but they were afraid to do so because they did not 
want to be ostracised like Adam and Ali Miftah. They also did not want to lose access to their 
share of the extra food. But as the “cooperative” group grew in number, they gathered up their 
courage and decided to break with their mentor, Aman Abdurrahman.25 
They were delighted when Amri, Wak Geng and the anti-IS crowd received a package of 
books that criticised ISIS.26 Armed with the arguments in these books, they began to try and 
influence the fence-sitters who were still debating about whether or not to join IS. They con-
vinced Agus Anton Figian, who had joined the oath-taking on 2 July, to pull away. Their group 
got a boost in September 2014 when Abu Umar openly joined the anti-IS group. His decision 
stemmed from a dispute with Abu Husna, who criticised him for staying neutral and for being 
willing to pray in the prison mosque. The best way to show disdain for Abu Husna was to for-
mally join the opposition.
The bad blood between the two groups reached a climax in September 2014, when the 21 
inmates who had not taken the oath to IS and al-Baghdadi issued an anti-ISIS declaration. Abu 
Umar took part in the drafting.
After the declaration, the anti-IS group grew stronger, not only in terms of numbers, but also 
in terms of supplies. Abu Umar was key to logistics, and after he joined, the extra food he re-
ceived could be distributed to the others to make up for what the non-cooperatives had received 
21 “Ustadz ABB: Kerahkan SEnjata Do’a Agar ISIS Menang di Baghdad”, www.al-mustaqbal.net, 20 June 2014.
22 The 23 were Abu Husna, Abu Irhab, Abu Yusuf, Aryanto Haluta, Beben Khairul Rizal, Jajah Miharja, Anton Sujarwo alias 
Supriyadi, Syailendra Sapta, Rahmat Hizbullah (Bima), Muhammad Natsirudin alias Cecep (Bima), Awaludin Nasir, Agus 
Anton Figian,David Kurniawan alias Kalishnakov, Muhammad Yusuf alias Yusuf Rizaldi, Achmad Widodo alias Abu Han-
ifah, Jamaludin alias Dugok (Aceh), Kamarudin alias Mayor (Aceh), Fikram alias Ayah Banta (Aceh); Mansur Saridin alias 
Mancuk (Aceh); Rian Adi Wijaya alias Andre Anggara (since released); Roki Aprisdiyanto and Helmy Priwardhani.
23 For a full description of the sequence of events, see “The Evolution of ISIS in Indonesia”, op.cit.
24 IPAC interviews, Pasir Putih, November 2014.
25 These included Chamidi, from the Badri Hartono group (sometimes called Al Qaeda Indonesia, AQI); Thoriq and Jodi 
from the Achmad Sofian group involved in the unplanned bomb explosion in Beji, Depok; Nang Ndut (released in Decem-
ber 2014) from the Cirebon group and others.
26 The books, included Jubah Sang Khilafah by Abu Qatadah al-Filistini, an ISIS critic and Fakta-fakta Gelap ISIS by Abu Ah-
mad, which was posted on the site dakwahmuqowamah.blogspot.com. An adviser to the prison would compile the titles, 
then have the prison reproduce and distribute the articles.
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through the pro-IS network. They also got extra help from prison officials, including a supply of 
cigarettes, which the stricter Muslims shunned. At the same time, after JAT split, donations to 
Ba’asyir and his friends declined sharply and the little that was left had to be divided among 21 
members. Some of the pro-ISIS began to have economic difficulties in prison and tried to build 
up their own businesses inside prison. For example Jaja Miharja, one of the ISIS supporters, 
began to make a sweet drink (cendol) to sell because he could no longer depend on handouts 
from Ba’asyir. 
The IS issue drew the cooperative prisoners closer to officials. It was partly because both were 
vilified by the pro-IS group and because of the extra supplies the officials provided, but it was 
also because these officials helped with family visits or with money to make calls, and they more 
they had contact with their families, the more they missed them, particularly their children. The 
non-cooperative prisoners had a much harder time seeing family. 
D. Analysis of Networks
As noted at the outset, many of the decisions taken by inmates in the lead-up to the oath-taking 
on 2 July seem to have had nothing to do with ideological principle.
Grievances and feelings of being ill-used, including unhappiness with Regulation 99, moved six 
of the original nine to reject cooperation with prison authorities—and then find religious argu-
ments to justify it). Abu Husna had his own grievances over losing the tamping mesjid job. His shift 
from cooperative to uncooperative was crucial, and one question is whether anything could have 
been done differently. The decision to stop unauthorised religious lessons for criminal offenders 
was clearly the right one, but there might have been a way by which Abu Husna could have been 
encouraged to offer some better-supervised language instruction in a way that would have rec-
ognised his expertise but kept the risk of radicalisation down. 
Likewise, authorities were right to tighten conditions on remission and release; the idea of 
“justice collaborator” was perhaps a bit crude.
On the other side, Abu Umar moved decisively to the anti-IS side because he resented being 
the target of Abu Husna’s criticism.
Some of the fence-sitters made their choice on the basis of where they could get extra food, 
so they may have been tempted to join the militants because of the extra supplies but several 
could be tempted back. This suggests that if the prison—especially a supposedly super maximum 
security prison—could better manage gifts and donations to the inmates, they might also better 
manage the alliances. Initially Pasir Putih was supposed to be a place with no cash, extra-tight 
inspections and no cell phone service but these goals seem to have lapsed. 
The Pasir Putih inmates seem to have passed through intermediate stages of cooperation or 
non-cooperation on the way to deciding for or against IS. No extremist inmate at Pasir Putih 
who swore allegiance to IS has been cooperative at the same time; supporting IS by definition 
entailed rejecting participation in government programs.27 Likewise, but perhaps less obviously, 
no one in the anti-ISIS camp is uncooperative. It would be a mistake to equate cooperation with 
disengagement, however, as many inmates participate in prison programs simply to ensure that 
they are eligible for remissions and early release. Nevertheless, if the immediate goals are to pre-
vent the pro-ISIS group from growing and to strengthen the anti-ISIS camp, then prison officials 
27 There have been examples in other prisons of inmates hiding their support for ISIS and being fully cooperative, only to 
try to leave for Syria as soon as they got out. Moh. Sibghotullah is one, but he was released in May 2014, before the Islam-
ic State was declared. It is not clear whether he would have felt compelled to openly declare allegiance if he had still been 
in prison on 29 June. Also, he had been in a prison where few inmates shared his pro-ISIS views. If he had been detained 
in Pasir Putih, Kembang Kuning or Tangerang, where there was a critical mass of supporters, he might have joined the 
openly hardline, non-cooperative camp.
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need to focus on the inmates in the “undecided” (tawaquf) group, especially the uncooperative 
ones who have had some exposure to hardline takfiri influence, because these are the individuals 
whom it is possible to pull back.28 
Once inmates have formally declared themselves one way or another, defections are rare 
but they do occur: Agus Anton Figian took part in the 2 July allegiance ceremony but then had 
second thoughts.
A few declared IS supporters have also been released. Rian alias Andre Anggara, for example, 
was released in late 2014. Because of his strong ties to Aman Abdurrahman, he would be one 
candidate for careful post-release monitoring to see whether or how his enthusiasm for IS man-
ifests itself now that he is free.
IV. SUPPORT FOR IS IN KEMBANG KUNING
The dynamics in Kembang Kuning prison are somewhat different because there are many fewer 
convicted terrorists—only thirteen—and terrorists and criminal offenders mix freely. The thir-
teen include some of the most high-profile in the jihadi movement: Oman Rochman alias Aman 
Abdurrahman, one of Indonesia’s most militant clerics; Iwan Dharmawan alias Rois and Ach-
mad Hasan, sentenced to death for their role in the 2004 bombing of the Australian Embassy; 
Subur Sugiarto, sentenced to life for the 2005 Bali bombing; and Indrawarman alias Toni Togar, 
a Jemaah Islamiyah leader who masterminded several bank robberies designed to raise funds 
for jihad operations. 
The prison, built in 1950, was never designed to hold high-risk prisoners, and there are no 
special facilities. It has a capacity of 273 prisoners but as of late 2014 housed only 165. It is small 
enough so that even though terrorists and ordinary offenders are housed together, prison staff 
can easily observe any gatherings. 
When the first batch of terrorist inmates arrived in 2010, they all seemed to be model prison-
ers, taking part in religious discussions for “spiritual guidance” and skill training programs. The 
situation changed dramatically, however, after Aman Abdurrahman was transferred there in 
November 2012.29 If in Pasir Putih, the hardline community grew through a series of grievances 
with prison authorities, in Kembang Kuning, Aman’s influence was the main factor. 
A. Aman Abdurrahman vs Toni Togar
Aman began to spread the ideology of takfir mu’ayyan, branding all prison employees as kafir 
because they worked in the security apparatus of what he deemed to be an idolatrous govern-
ment.30 He forbade cooperation with any prison programs on the grounds that this violated the 
principle al wala wal baro (loyalty to Islam and hostility to the enemy), including praying in the 
prison mosque. 
The first of the inmates to adopt Aman’s teachings was Rois, who began refusing to take part 
in Friday prayers at the prison mosque. The others agreed that the Indonesian government itself 
was idolatrous (thaghut) but did not believe that this made everyone who worked for it a kafir. 
They remained open to participating in prison programs.
Over time, however, Kembang Kuning inmates split in two, with Aman leading the hardline 
takfiris and Toni Togar the rest. The split destroyed at least one friendship: Rois and Achmad 
28 In this context, where virtually everyone is committed to jihad, the hardliners stand out by their takfiri stand, that is, their 
willingness to declare as kafir or non-believer any Muslim who takes a less puritan and literal interpretation of Islamic law.
29 He was serving a nine-year sentence in connection with the Aceh training camp.
30 For a discussion of the debate over takfir mu’ayyan vs takfir am, see IPAC Report, The Evolution of ISIS, p.6.
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Hasan, the 2004 Australian Embassy bombers, had once been close but now fell out on opposite 
sides. New arrivals were pressed to choose. In early 2013, two new inmates, Mushala and Arif 
Budiman, convicted for their role in the 2011 Cirebon police mosque bombing, joined Aman, 
whom they had long admired. Two other new inmates, however, took Toni Togar’s side: Pri-
yatmo, from the Abu Umar group, and Arifin Nur Haryanto, arrested in connection with the 
Cirebon bombing.31 
In March 2013 two more new inmates joined Aman: Ali Umar Yusuf alias Baro and Ali 
Azhari, from Lampung and Aceh respectively who were arrested in connection with the 2010 
Aceh training camp.32 The same month, a bitter dispute broke out between the two factions after 
a donation came in for the jihadis. Rois received it on behalf of the inmates, but he removed Toni 
Togar’s name from the list of recipients and said the donor did not want his funds being used to 
support those who took part in thaghut programs. Several inmates objected, because they knew 
that the donor had set no conditions. In the end, Rois capitulated and gave Toni his share. 
From that point on, tensions between the two groups rose, reaching a peak when the anger 
over Regulation 99 erupted. Aman Abdurrahman, like Ba’asyir, issued a fatwa that to abide by 
its terms was forbidden; Toni Togar argued that emergency conditions, of which imprisonment 
was one, warranted measures that would otherwise be impermissible, including complying with 
the regulation. 
Aman’s fatwa had little impact beyond his immediate circle; the inmates close to Toni Togar 
continued to submit applications for release and do what was needed to secure it. Aman then 
declared Toni an apostate and kafir and refused to respond to his greetings or attend prayers with 
him. He also stopped inviting Toni’s cellmates, Subur Sugiarto and Achmad Hasan, to pray to-
gether, as if they were guilty by association. Aman’s extremism in so branding Toni Togar shocked 
some of the other prisoners. “How can Aman Abdurrahman, who only knows jihad through the 
internet, call Toni a kafir when Toni has waged jihad in Afghanistan and Ambon and carried 
out many jihadi operations?” one said.33 Toni himself responded in an article criticising Aman, 
though not by name, in an article that appeared on radical websites in November 2013.34
What had started as an ideological conflict between takfir mu’ayyan and takfir am (the count-
er-doctrine that rejects collective punishment and requires the examination of individual sins) 
turned into a deeply bitter personal feud. If Aman declared a particular practice haram, Toni 
and his friends made a point of flouting him. After he forbade inmates to take part in religious 
guidance sessions led by NU clerics because he considered NU to be deviant, Toni’s faction be-
came active participants. When he declared that honouring the Indonesian flag was idolatrous, 
Toni and his friends made a point of attending flag-raising ceremonies. When Aman refused to 
meet visiting ulama from the Middle East, Toni Togar welcomed them.
Toni and his friends were not the only ones that Aman declared kafir; he extended his con-
demnation to other prisoners and officials. He refused, for example to receive food from prison 
officials on Idul Adha, Islam’s second most important holy day during which animals are sacri-
ficed and the meat distributed to the poor, arguing that it was forbidden to eat from an animal 
that had been slain by a kafir.35
Aman’s attitude limited his influence among the other Kembang Kuning prisoners. When 
Aman declared his support for ISIS, no one outside his group followed suit; certainly no one on 
the Toni Togar side showed any interest. 
31 Arifin had been a member of the anti-vice group, Tim Hisbah, in Solo, which turned to terrorism in late 2010.
32 Baro was a student of Mustaqim alias Abu Yusuf, while Ali Azhari was a student of Agam Fitriadi and Yudi Zulfahri. Abu 
Yusuf, Agam and Yudi were themselves all Aman’s students.  
33 IPAC interviews with ex-prisoner, Jakarta, November 2014. 
34 “Terperosok di Kembangkuning”, thoriquna.wordpress.com, 29 November 2013.
35 IPAC interviews in Kembang Kuning, October 2014.
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Aman’s own support for ISIS, which he declared in November 2013, may have arisen from 
his personal quarrel with the radical website arrahmah.com which has become known for its 
anti-ISIS, pro al-Nusra stance. The quarrel began after Arrahmah posted a translation of a piece 
by Abu Qatadah al-Filistini entitled “Message From Prison to the Mujahidin of Sham.”36 It urged 
jihadi groups in Syria to end their differences, without suggesting who was right or wrong. 
Aman accused Arrahmah of deliberately translating the piece in a tendentious way in order to 
discredit ISIS. He then posted his translation of a refutation, and said that while initially he had 
not wanted to take sides, he felt obliged to defend ISIS in the face of Arrahmah’s distortions. 
Aman and Arrahmah had had several other disputes. 37 
Even if Aman initially defended ISIS because he was annoyed with Arrahmah, he became 
convinced it was worthy of support, especially after it declared itself to be a government (dau-
lah) and not merely an organisation. ISIS then declared that all other jihadi groups must submit 
to it and said it would wage war on anyone who refused. Aman’s support was not lessened by 
evidence of ISIS brutality. In his view, it was correct that anyone refusing to take an oath of loy-
alty to ISIS should be seen as the enemy and thus a legitimate target of war. He approved of ISIS’s 
strict policy in upholding takfir mu’ayyan. 
Even though Aman’s influence was limited in Kembang Kuning, it was much more extensive 
in jihadi circles outside. Since November 2013 Aman had been translating pro-ISIS material and 
challenging any criticism of the organisation. He would download this material via his hand-
phone, then give the translations to one of his many visitors who would then upload the material 
on various jihadi sites such millahibrahim.wordpress.com, shoututssalam.com, al-mustaqbal.
net and various social media such as Facebook and Twitter. Between November 2013 and No-
vember 2014, he translated some 115 articles. In addition to the online campaign, he ordered his 
followers to undertake other pro-ISIS activities such as discussions and demonstrations. 
Aman also ordered his followers to prevent religious outreach (dakwah) from groups that he 
considered deliberately blurred the distinction between right and wrong. The chief character-
istic of these groups, including JAT, was their rejection of the concept of takfir mu’ayyan and of 
ISIS. In November 2013 Aman and Rois had a discussion with JAT leader Fuad al-Hazimi who 
came to Kembang Kuning about democracy and the status of legislators as members of thaghut 
forces. For Aman, it was clear they were all kafir. But al-Hazimi saw democracy and by extension 
parliamentarians as murky in legal terms, not clearly forbidden. 
After this discussion, Aman ordered his followers to prevent JAT activities. For example, in 
Bima, he told one of his trusted students, Iskandar alias Abu Qutaibah, to restrict the space for 
JAT teachings. Iskandar obeyed by removing JAT members from the schedule of Friday preach-
ers in the mosque in his neighborhood; he was arrested a month later, in December 2013. 
Fuad al-Hazimi had a moderating influence on JAT, to the disgust of more militant members. 
As noted above, Aman also asked his followers in Pasir Putih to ensure that Abu Bakar Ba’asyir 
was protected from the influence of al-Hazimi and his friends, tasking Abu Irhab, Abu Yusuf 
and others to stay with him at all times. 
On 16 April 2014 Aman swore an oath of allegiance to ISIS and to Abu Bakar al-Baghdadi, 
which he renewed on 30 June, a day after ISIS declared a caliphate. His followers inside and 
36 For text, see “Syaikh Abu Qatada al-Filistini: Pesan dari Penjara Untuk Mujahidin Syam”, al-mustaqbal.net, 1 November 
2013.
37 Aman’s anger toward Arrahmah dated back to 2012 when he debated the issue of takfir mu’ayyan versus takfir am with 
an Arrahmah writer named Muhib Al Majdi. It was Muhib who also translated the Abu Qatadah piece. But this was not 
Aman’s only problem with Arrahmah. In 2013 Aman had had a debate with Irfan Awwas, who happened to be the uncle 
of Muhammad Jibriel, publisher of Arrahmah. Aman criticised Irfan Awwas for believing that Indonesian politicians like 
Taufiq Kiemas and Megawati Sukarnoputri could be Muslims. In his view, any Muslim who supporting the application of 
Islamic law in full is by definition apostate. Two months before Aman declared his support for ISIS, he had also debated 
Irfan on democracy. 
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outside prison did likewise. In Kelapa Dua on 5 July, for example, Iskandar led several terrorists 
there to swear allegiance.38 
In June, a new inmate arrived who proved to be another of Aman’s students, giving the Aman 
faction a slight edge.39 But in July, in a rare case of an ISIS defection, Abu Baro suddenly ap-
proached a Kembang Kuning prison official and asked that he be moved out of Aman’s cell 
because he could no longer endure all the regulations that Aman imposed, including the ban on 
applying for remissions. Abu Baro missed his family and wanted to go home. Eventually he was 
moved to another cell and since then has become cooperative, taking part in religious guidance 
programs in expectation of receiving remissions. Aman’s supporters were thus reduced to Ali 
Azhari, Rois, Mushala, Arief Budiman and M.Iqbal alias Kiki. 
After the Ba’asyir’s loyalty oath in Pasir Putih became an issue in the media, officials began to 
watch Aman and his friends in Kembang Kuning more closely. In late September 2014, security 
forces conducted a search of Aman’s cell and confiscated ten handphones that his group was 
using. For a while this limited their ability to campaign on the outside and for almost a month, 
no pro-IS material appeared on radical sites. But by the end of October, Aman was able to buy a 
new phone from one of the criminal inmates, and on 3 November, Aman emerged on line again 
with a translation of an IS treatise on “Slavery According to the Teachings of Islam.” 
B. Analysis of Networks
The expansion of Aman’s network inside Kembang Kuning has come not so much from re-
cruitment of other inmates inside, but from the transfer of new inmates to the prison who were 
already his students or predisposed to be his followers. Because Aman’s followers tend to be the 
most militant and the most supportive of IS, it may make sense to keep them in a few places 
where supervision is tightest, but any transfers to Kembang Kuning need to be carefully thought 
through.
Also, the fact that Aman does not seem to have recruited many other prisoners in the last year 
should not be cause for complacency. His track record in other prisons, especially Sukamiskin 
Prison in Bandung where he was detained in 2006-2007 and Jakarta police headquarters where 
he was held after his 2010 arrest, suggests that his capacity to win over other inmates is high.
Prison authorities also need to be wary of trusting Toni Togar. He may be a constructive force 
for the moment because he is taking an anti-IS stance and has strong leadership credentials. But 
he has a history of directing jihadi operations from prison and recruiting criminal offenders in 
the process; it would be a huge mistake to regard him as disengaged.
V. PRISON NETWORKS AND TRAVEL TO SYRIA
It has been clear from late 2013 onwards that some of the networks for getting to Syria run through 
prisons.40 (As of January 2015, according to figures compiled by the police counter-terrorism unit, 
38 These included Sigit Indrajit of the Myanmar Embassy plot, and Willem Maksum and Agus Widharto alias Agus Nangka 
of Mujahidin Indonesia Barat.
39 Kiki alias Muhammad Iqbal was part of a group with Yuli Harsono and Fahrul Rozi Tanjung operating out of Bandung that 
was responsible for the killing of three police in central Java in March and April 2010, not long after the Aceh camp was 
broken up. He received a six-year sentence in June 2011.
40 See “The Evolution of ISIS in Indonesia”, IPAC Report No. 13, and “Indonesians and the Syrian Conflict, IPAC Report No. 
6, both op. cit.
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Detachment 88, 123 Indonesians had been identified as having joined the fighting in Syria.)41 IS 
requires recommendations for fighters, much like getting references to go to university; sometimes 
prisoners can help obtain them. Sometimes they have relatives or friends who facilitate travel. 
There seem to be at least five channels in Indonesia for getting to Syria, and not all are to IS. Two 
are to al-Nusra, one of them run by JI. It is reportedly so tightly controlled that it is difficult for any-
one other than formally inducted JI members to get approved. Getting accepted by the IS channels 
is reportedly easier. One of these is run by Aman through Pamulang and Bekasi; another appears 
to be run by former Laskar Jundullah members out of Malang and Makassar. Enterprising Indone-
sians rejected by the any of the above can sometimes find their way in separately.
A. Getting Approved by IS
IS normally requires that would-be foreign fighters obtain a recommendation from someone 
already with its forces in Syria or Iraq. Two Indonesians trusted by IS in this regard are Bagus 
Maskuron and Salim Mubarok. Bagus left Indonesia in May 2013. Salim has gone twice, first 
from mid-2013 to early 2014, then again in March 2014 when he left with his family in a group 
of about twenty. They have both appeared in IS propaganda videos, and their recommendations 
are said to be immediately accepted.42 Abu Fida, an avid promoter of IS in Indonesia, was one 
of those who left for Syria on Salim Mubarok’s endorsement. He only got as far as Turkey, when 
he was quarantined for health reasons, then deported. (Because Indonesia has no law banning 
efforts to join foreign extremist organisations, police eventually arrested him for a crime com-
mitted four years earlier.)
There are a few individuals in Indonesia who are so trusted by IS that their recommendation 
is sufficient, without additional references from the front. Aman Abdurrahman is one; he earned 
IS’s trust through his writings, which his students, including Bahrum Syah, brought to Syria. 
Until September 2014, Aman had set up selection committees in Pamulang and Bekasi from 
among his students and was running them from prison. The committees would assess possible 
candidates, then Aman would give a recommendation accordingly.
But in September 2014, the committees were disbanded, at least temporarily, after the arrest 
of Agus Priyatno and his wife, Eka Lestari, on the Turkish border. Agus, who came from Sumed-
ang, West Java, and Eka, who was from Bekasi, had left with their children as part of a larger 
group that had been selected by the Bekasi committee. When they got to the border, Agus and 
his wife left the group to go off and meet with a friend who had joined IS. After the meeting, as 
they were on their way back to rejoin the group, they were arrested by Turkish authorities and 
eventually deported to Indonesia. The children stayed with the group and are now in Syria. The 
Bekasi committee was held responsible for the incident for failing to give sufficiently clear in-
structions that it any meeting outside the group was absolutely forbidden.
On 2 December 2014, a recently released prisoner, Mohammed Sibghotullah, was arrested 
in Malaysia en route to Syria with his wife, Rachmawati; Bagus Maskuron’s family; and a few 
others. Sibghotullah, who served most of a three-year sentence in Porong Prison, Surabaya, for 
41 Detachment 88 figures have steadily risen from 86 in June 2014 to 96 in October to 110 in December to 123 in January 
2015. This total includes men and women identified by name, including wives who have accompanied their mujahidin 
husbands, but it does not include individuals going back and forth to Syria as members of humanitarian missions, even 
when the missions are linked to extremist groups. The true figure of fighters is higher, because not all fighters have been 
identified, but there is no reason to believe it has reached “264” or “350” or some of the other numbers bandied about in 
the media.
42 Salim Mubarok Attamimi, also known as Abu Jandal, appeared in a video posted on YouTube on 25 December 2014, 
warning the Indonesian police and military that he and others would come back to Indonesia to “massacre you one by 
one” for refusing to apply Islamic law. He also says in the video that he would welcome Indonesia’s participation in the 
US-led coalition against IS, so that he and other fighters can confront the security forces directly. See www.youtube.com/
watch?v=GOsfcFXLKE0. 
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his role in the Aceh training camp, had been one of the model prisoners: fully cooperative with 
prison staff and willing to participate in all programs aimed at rehabilitation. In retrospect, his 
aim seems to have been to get out as quickly as possible, and his plans for going to Syria appear 
to have been well-developed before his release; his brother-in-law, Siswanto, was already active 
in helping people leave. When Sibghotullah was released in early 2014, he continued to plan his 
departure from his home in Magetan, East Java; Siswanto left sometime in mid-2014. 
B. Finding A Separate Path to Syria 
Individuals determined to get to Syria can find their own way there, even without recommen-
dations. Afif Abdul Madjid’s experience is a case in point. One of the original JI members who 
joined when the organisation broke away from Darul Islam in 1993, Ustad (Teacher) Afif has 
always followed Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. He left JI to join MMI in 2002, then left to join JAT in 2008, 
but continued working at a JI-affiliated pesantren in Solo. He had wanted to go to Syria since 
2012 and had tried to join delegations first from a Palestinian solidarity group, then from the 
humanitarian organisation HASI as an Arabic language interpreter, but both had long waiting 
lists from their own members. In November 2013, he contacted an acquaintance at the radical 
website Shoutussalam.com and asked him if he could help, knowing that he had excellent con-
nections in Syria. The Shoutussalam contact refused, on the grounds that JAT members could 
not be trusted. Ustad Afif continued to search for a way in until he found a doctor outside Solo 
who gave him the name of a Syrian doctor working on the Turkish-Syrian border. 
Together with a pesantren colleague from Lombok, they left for Istanbul via Malaysia in 
December 2013 and contacted the doctor when they arrived. He told them to take a plane to 
Hattai, a town on the Turkish side of the border, and after they arrived, helped them cross over 
into Syria, where an IS fighter took them to his headquarters. There they met several Indone-
sians from Ngruki. They were instructed to join a military training camp where in early January, 
they both swore an oath of loyalty to al-Baghdadi. Ustad Afif returned to Indonesia later that 
month; his colleague stayed on. 
Ustad Afif became a major promoter of IS when he got back and was a speaker at an event 
in Solo in mid-July 2014 that concluded with a pledge of loyalty to IS on the part of all partici-
pants.43 He was arrested on 9 August 2014, but again, because it is not a crime under Indonesian 
law to go to Syria, he was therefore accused of helping to fund the Aceh training camp in 2010 
and will be tried accordingly.
C. Organisational Affiliation Not A Reliable Guide
In analysing support for IS among prisoners, it becomes clear that organisational affiliation is 
not a reliable guide. JI is mostly anti-IS and supportive of al-Nusra, but at least two JI members are 
with IS and there is likely to be more pro-IS sentiment in the younger generation. JAT is split, as 
are several other smaller groups.
One interesting example is Ring Banten, the Darul Islam faction whose members took part 
both in the 2002 Bali bombing and the 2004 Australian Embassy attack. Its leaders include Rois 
from Pasir Putih, who as noted above, is one of Aman Abdurrahman’s staunchest allies. His fel-
low Ring Banten member in Pasir Putih, Sapta Syailendra, is also among the pro-IS, pro-Aman 
hard core. But his nephew, Zainal Mutaqin alias Zaki Rachmatullah, released in 2014 after serv-
ing time for his role in the Aceh camp, was cooperative while in prison even though he was in 
43 See www.al-mustaqbal.net/deklarasi-forum-pendukung-daulah-islamiyah-sambut-khilafah-untuk-ketentraman-ibadah. 
The other speakers were Abu Fida, the man who had tried unsuccessfully to get to Syria some months earlier, and Amir 
Mahmud, whose son was one of the first Indonesians to join ISIS and remained in Syria as of January 2015.
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the same prison as Rois, and has shown no pro-IS inclinations since his release. Several other 
Ring Banten prisoners are cooperative and have not joined either side of the IS debate.
Another Ring Banten member, Indera Enjen alias Hamzah alias Boim, was arrested in Au-
gust 2014 and charged with assisting the Aceh training camp in 2010. He is currently awaiting 
trial in Kelapa Dua but has already developed a reputation as a hardliner. It will be interesting to 
see where prison authorities place him after trial: with other hardliners in Nusakambangan or 
with the more moderate in Cipinang or Porong where he would be ideologically more isolated. 
Nur Ikhwan Robbik, a Ring Banten in Tangerang Prison, is fervently pro-IS. 
Two Ring Banten members, Abdul Rauf and Rosikin Nur, sometimes written Rosikhien 
Noor, are known to have fought with ISIS but both reportedly left for Syria more because they 
were committed to fighting on behalf of fellow Muslims than because they believed deeply in 
IS ideology. If they had been accepted by the JI channel, they might have chosen that route, but 
it was easier to get to Syria via the IS channel, and that seems to be why the two men chose it.
Abdul Rauf, released in 2011 after serving more than eight years for his role in the Bali bomb-
ing, was a model prisoner and by all accounts remorseful and convinced that violence against ci-
vilians in Indonesia was wrong. When he was brought into the Bali bombing by Imam Samudra, 
he believed he was going to be sent to Ambon to fight. When he was released, he was a regular 
visitor to Nusakambangan to visit Rois and on one occasion expressed a desire to fight in Myan-
mar to avenge violence against Muslims there. Rois told him how he could get to Syria instead. 
Abdul Rauf left in early 2014 and was killed in May 2014 in Ramadi, Iraq.
Rosikin Nur was never imprisoned though he was briefly detained twice, once after the Aus-
tralian Embassy bombing and once in connection with the Aceh training camp, but in both 
cases, he was released after questioning. He left with Bahrum Syah at the end of May 2014 and 
appears with him in the “Joining the Ranks” video.
The message getting back to other Ring Banten members may thus well be a mixed one.
D. Prisoner Releases and Possible Departures to Syria
Given the presence of ex-prisoners among the Indonesian IS fighters, there has been much con-
cern expressed internationally about the imates due for release this year and next. The number 
released in 2013-14 was about 88 (see Appendix A); the figure for expected releases in 2015-16 is 
well over 130. Most are likely concerned primarily in trying to restart their lives, but there will be 
a small subset interested in Syria, and the economic inducements offered by IS means that those 
who do have difficulty finding jobs or making ends meet could be tempted. 
It is not just the recently released who may be interested however. Abdul Rauf, as noted, left for 
Syria some three years after his release and there are some potentially dangerous jihadis who have 
been out of prison for even longer. Indonesia continues to lack an effective post-release monitoring 
system for convicted terrorists, let alone for ordinary criminals who might be recruited in prison. 
On this point, it is worth noting that the danger of such recruitment, at least in the Nusakamban-
gan prisons, seems to come less from the most militant but rather from the ranks of what might be 
called the “deceptively cooperative” like Toni Togar, who though currently the leader of the anti-IS 
faction in Pasir Putih, nevertheless has a history of recruiting common criminals while in prison. 
The takfir mu’ayyan supporters, on the other hand, may be too strict to appeal to many ordinary 
offenders.44
44 That said, it is worth remembering the case of Helmi Priwardhani. He was a criminal offender whom Aman Abdurrahman 
recruited while in Sukamiskin Prison in 2006-7. On his release, he joined a jihadi group of Aman supporters that killed 
three policemen. He was rearrested and is currently detained in Pasir Putih where he took part in the 2 July 2014 oath-tak-
ing to IS. Even if he receives no remissions, he is due for release in 2016.
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VI. WHAT THE GOVERNMENT CAN DO 
The burden of curbing the influence of IS in prisons falls heavily on the Corrections Directorate 
and the police, and both are concerned about the problem. Indonesia needs a better legal deter-
rent as well, however, and the parliament needs to do its part by adopting a law that would ban 
participation in foreign extremist organisations—without at the same time turning the existing 
ant-terrorism law into a draconian Internal Security Act. 
A. The Prisons
For the first time, there is some good news on the prisons front. The growth in the number of 
anti-IS prisoners in Pasir Putih from two to 21 is the direct result of increased capacity of pris-
on staff. Several have become interested in trying to pull individual inmates out of the hardline 
ranks through a variety of different approaches. 
Few, if any, have the religious training that would enable them to engage the prisoners in 
serious doctrinal debate, but in some cases they have allowed the circulation of hard copies of 
anti-IS arguments posted on sites such as Arrahmah, even if these tracts also contain arguments 
in favor of jihad. This helps challenge the ideological supremacy of the IS supporters. Prison 
authorities have also developed a list of printed material to look for and confiscate from visitors. 
For example in October 2014, officials in one of the Nusakambangan prisons confiscated pro-IS 
material that had been brought in by one of the wives. The official knew to confiscate it, because 
of the title: Lessons from the Murder of Ahrar al-Syam Leaders (Pelajaran dan Renungan Atas 
Terbunuhnya Petinggi Ahrar Al Syam), Ahrar al-Syam being a jihadi militia in Syria that IS has 
attacked. Only regular training workshops for officials can keep them updated about what to 
look for, and while extremist material will always get through, it is at least a start.
Prison staff are more comfortable talking about family issues. Most inmates, as noted, miss 
their families and know their incarceration has caused economic hardship for those left behind. 
It also not infrequently has caused the family to be ostracised, either by the community or by 
former friends in the radical network who believe the inmate is cooperating with authorities. 
Some prison staff have reached out to inmates by offering them more opportunities to call home. 
This only works as an incentive if communications are strictly regulated in the first place; when 
one prisoner can have ten handphones in his cell, offers of family calls are not likely to have 
much effect. 
Officials can also try and reduce dependence on the extra food that terrorist prisoners get from 
donors, but thus far, it is more by looking for alternative sources, including providing it themselves, 
than by trying and curb the donations; it is unclear why gifts that empower the most militant in-
mates cannot be more strictly controlled, particularly in a super maximum security facility.
In some cases, prison personnel have made concessions in standard procedures in exchange 
for cooperation—for example by agreeing not to do body searches of women visitors, even 
though these are always carried out by women police officers, on the promise that the women 
will not bring in anything problematic. Whether this is supremely naïve or an effective reward 
for good behavior in a few carefully selected cases remains to be seen. Some wives can be more 
militant than their husbands.
Some prison authorities have tried to ensure that guards hired be religiously observant and pi-
ous, to confound the stereotype the militants try to propagate of prison personnel as anshar thaghut, 
or partisans of the oppressors. The men they brand as kafir turn out to be good Muslims who regu-
larly pray and fast, and this can be an asset. The trick is to ensure that piety is not transformed into 
sympathy and then into recruitment, as has happened with a few prison guards in the past.
Some prisons are providing increased religious guidance. In Kembang Kuning, inmates are 
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expected to attend a program run by the local branch of Indonesia’s largest Muslim social organ-
isation, Nahdlatul Ulama called Pondok Pesantren Hikmatul Musibah, as if it were an Islamic 
school based inside the prison. The result of an initiative of a prison official who happens to be 
an active NU member, the pesantren conducts classes four times a week, and both criminas and 
terrorism offenders take part. Aman Abdurrahman’s followers stay away. The program is popu-
lar, not so much because it changes mindsets or interpretations about jihad but because it gives 
the inmates a forum to discuss various problems thrown up by imprisonment, including family 
issues. Four times a week is about as much religious instruction as many inmates—especially 
the criminal offenders but sometimes the convicted terrorists as well—can take, and they are not 
interested in hearing more from the hardliners. 
The need to manage inmate relations, and relations between prison personnel and inmates, 
goes beyond the effort to develop an instrument for assessing high-risk offenders, as is current-
ly being undertaken by the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute 
(UNICRI). That effort is valuable but it cannot be at the expense of other intiatives designed 
to help prison officials understand the inmates they are dealing with and encourage a sense of 
professional pride in their ability to do so. 
It also is not a substitute for a broader strategy of managing inmates that has genuine buy-
in from prison staff. Nusakambangan is receiving assistance from the International Criminal 
Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) of the U.S. government. One part of the 
program is aimed at implementing international “Terrorist Management Guidelines” but it is 
something of an uphill struggle. Prison authorities are often resistant to international templates 
that they believe are not always suitable for application in the Indonesian context.
B. Police
The police have their own work cut out for them in managing the men arrested and placed in the 
Kelapa Dua police facility. Until late 2012, most newly detained suspected terrorists were held in 
a lock-up at Jakarta police headquarters. After the highly publicised escape of one of the inmates 
in November 2012, who subsequently wrote a scathing article on the lax security there, police 
gradually started moving detainees to Kelapa Dua.
Suspected terrorists are held in four blocks, in cells that hold up to seven inmates each. Block 
A is reserved for those considered hardcore or particularly dangerous, and it was in this block 
that the pro-IS ceremony took place on 5 July 2014. As of January 2015, Block A had 29 inmates, 
with Sigit Indrajit of the foiled Myanmar Embassy bomb plot one of the most intractable.
Coordination between Corrections on the one hand, and Detachment 88 and BNPT on the 
other, could be better, particularly in terms of information-sharing. Data-gathering in prisons 
is improving, but the channels for forwarding key information remain undeveloped—especially 
to the police who are actively investigating violent networks. Part of the problem is trust. The 
police have tended to look on their corrections colleagues with disdain, providing little en-
couragement to develop a healthy working relationship. For their part, prison staff, particularly 
lower echelons of the bureaucracy, frequently resent the fact that the police get all the glory—
and the extra perks. It should be remembered that after the 2002 Bali bombing, Deatchment 88 
developed into a top unit not just because of skills training, but because its members derived real 
professional pride from their accomplishments. The prison system needs an incentive structure 
for working with convicted terrorists that will give its staff the same sense of achievement.
It is particularly important that there be intensive consultation with prison authorities before 
inmates are moved from Kelapa Dua to the regular prison system, which often but not always 
happens after trial. One convicted terrorist now working closely with prison officials has sug-
gested that it before an imate is transferred, it would be helpful for the police to assess family 
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support for his activities. If his wife or other family members are strongly supportive of jihadi 
actions, police should ensure that he is transferred to a prison as far away from them as possible. 
If they are not militant themselves, the transfer should be to a prison close by where they can 
easily visit and persuade him to disengage. 
Procedures under Regulation 99 now require Detachment 88 to sign off on sentence reduc-
tions or releases of convicted terrorists. Prison officials complain that the unit’s assessment of 
an individual prisoner is often derived from the period immediately after arrest or during trial, 
whereas individuals can change after several years in prison. If police information is not up to 
date, there may be delays in approving releases for men who are in fact entitled to them. This can 
create frustration, not just for the prisoner who expected to get out, but for other inmates who 
see that participation in programs is not bringing the expected results. Communication between 
police and prison officials thus needs to take place on a systematic, ongoing basis. To aid in this 
effort, the Operations Division of BNPT in 2014 set up the “Team of Seven” (Tim Tujuh), com-
posed of prison officials, police, prosecutors and judges and others to facilitate communication. 
It seems to be helping but a formal evaluation would be useful.
C. The Need for Legislation
Police frequently complain that they lack adequate legal tools for dealing with homegrown ter-
rorism, and in the case of the Syria issue, they are right. They can be as vigilant as possible in 
trying to detect planned travel to or from Syria, and they can coordinate with authorities in 
neighboring countries such as Singapore and Malaysia or even with Turkey. But as long as join-
ing foreign military or terrorist organisations is not a crime, it is difficult to prosecute.
In early 2015, Indonesian authorities decided to try and use Article 139A of the Criminal 
Code against individuals joining or trying to join IS. The article is part of a section of the code 
punishing crimes against “friendly states”, and states that “rebellion with the intention of sepa-
rating a region in whole or in part from the control of the government in power there” can be 
punished with up to five years in prison. A test case is reportedly in preparation as this report 
went to press. President Jokowi also was reportedly planning to issue a regulation that would 
enable the government to revoke passports of individuals known to have left for Syria.
A full-fledged law banning assistance to or involvement in foreign terrorist organisations 
would still be desirable, but there are political tactics to consider. Any effort to embed some 
clauses to this effect in a strengthened anti-terrorist law that also included, for example, pro-
visions lengthening the allowable period of pre-trial detention, would likely run afoul of both 
conservative Muslims and civil liberties advocates. A separate bill, put on the legislative agenda 
while concern about IS remains high, might have more success. 
VII. CONCLUSION
Indonesian authorities had a hard enough time coping with terrorism offenders before the Syrian 
conflict erupted, but the emergence of IS and its rivals has added a new dimension to their difficul-
ties. For the last year, the Corrections Directorate has been making a concerted effort to learn more 
about the convicted terrorists under its authority and experiement with different techniques for 
managing them. It is critically important that these efforts be well documented and evaluated on 
a regular basis so that interventions that work in one prison can be replicated elsewhere and inef-
fective or counterproductive measures can be dropped. If certain interventions work, it is also im-
portant to understand why. If some useful Indonesian models for handling extremist inmates can 
be developed, it may be time for donor organisations, discouraged in the past by a combination of 
bureaucratic obstacles and rejection of international models, to look again at how they can help.
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Appendix A 
 
Distribution of Convicted Terrorists in Indonesian Prisons  
As of November 2014
Regional Office (Kanwil) Prison/Detention Centre Number of Inmates
Aceh
1. Banda Aceh
2. Bireuen Detention Centre
13 Persons
 1 Person
North Sumatra 1. Medan 6 Persons
South Sumatra 1. Palembang 7 Persons
Banten 1. Tangerang 20 Persons
DKI Jakarta
1. Cipinang

















3. Batu, Nusakambangan (NK)
4. Pasir Putih, NK


























Total : 269 Persons
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Appendix B 
Extremist Prisoners Released in 2013-2014
The following list of 88 people is based on Corrections Directorate information that covers re-
leases through the end of November 2014. A few additional releases that took place in Decem-
ber 2014 are included. The original list includes non-jihadis convicted of terrorism; we list only 
those involved in extremist organisations here.45 
A. Released since June 2014
1. Ade Guntur (book bombs)
2. Agus Mahmudi (Sunata, ex-JI) 
3. Amir Abdillah (Noordin)
4. Amri Firmansyah alias Ali Miftah
5. Andre Anggara (Abu Umar, Aman Abdurrahman)
6. Asmuni alias Munir (Abu Umar)
7. Bintang Juliardhi (Sunata) 
8. Darwoto (Abu Umar)
9. Eko Prasetyo alias Zubeir (Aceh camp)
10. Fajar Dwi Setyo (book bombs)
11. Febri Hermawan (book bombs)
12. Hari Budiman (Aceh camp, Aman Abdurrahman assistant)
13. Hasanuddin (schoolgirl beheadings, JI)
14. JokoWibowo (KOMPAK, hid Noordin)
15. Khairul Ghazali (CIMB robbery)
16. Mugianto (book bombs)
17. Nanang Irawan alias Nang Ndut (Cirebon mosque, Klaten)
18. Parmin alias Yasir Abdul Barr (JI, Noordin)
19. Rahmat alias Rahmat Ibnu Umar (Bima)
20. Riki Riyanto (book bombs)
21. Sudarno (Cirebon group)
22. Sugiharto (Abu Umar)
23. Suhanto alias Borju (Cirebon group)
24. Taufik Abdul Halim (Atrium bombing, deported to Malaysia)
25. Yahya bin Syafi’i/Sapiih (Taliban Melayu)
26. Zein Efendi (Sunata friend, arrested with BintangJuliardhi, above)
B. Released January-May 2014
27. Abdul Ghofur (Bandung group, arms sales, hid Sunata)
45 There were three non-jihadis released in 2014, all belonged to the group of Christians who killed two Muslim fish traders 
in Poso in 2006 in revenge for the judicial execution of three Christians accused of masterminding a massacre in a 
Muslim school in May 2000. In 2013, there were 20 non-jihadi releases, including 12 Christians from the same group; five 
individuals accused of sending bomb threats by SMS, including one mentally ill woman; and three members of Gerakan 
Aceh Merdeka (GAM) accused of trying to blow up the Jakarta Stock Exchange in 2000. 
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28. Abdul HarisMunandar (CIMB robbery)
29. Agam Fitriadi
30. Agung Jati Santoso (Klaten)
31. Anwar Effendi (Aceh camp)
32. Budi Supriyadi (police poison plot)
33. Fajar Novianto (Badri Hartono group, AQI)
34. Furqan (Bima)
35. Heri Kuswanto (CIMB robbery)
36. Joko Lelono (Klaten)
37. Joko Purwanto (Aceh camp)
38. Juhanda (book bombs)
39. Juni Kurniawan (book bombs)
40. Kurnia Widodo (Bandung group)
41. Mahmud Irsyad (Abu Umar)
42. Mansur Samin
43. Muhammad Maulana Sani alias MatunMaulana (book bombs)
44. Muchamad Syarif (book bombs)
45. Mujahidul Haq (Bima, raised funds for Aceh camp) [wants to join ISIS in Syria]
46. Nugroho Budi Santoso (Klaten)
47. Paimin alias Joni alias Gondrong (police poison plot)
48. Rachmat Hidayat (Bima)
49. Ridwan Lestaluhu (Ambon violence)
50. Moh. Sibghotullah (Aceh camp and more) REARRESTED en route to Syria 
51. Sudirman alias Yasir (helped Dulmatin) [wants to join ISIS in Syria]
52. Sugeng Setiaji (friend of Hari Kuncoro)
53. Taufik bin Marzuki (Aceh camp)
54. Taufik Hidayat Rizal (Abu Umar)
55. Tri Budi Santoso (Klaten)
56. Tongji alias Warsito (Aceh camp)
57. Wardi alias Edi Jabal (hiding guns for Abu Tholut)
58. Yudha Anggoro (Klaten)
59. Zainal Mutaqim bin Mahfud (Aceh camp)
C. Released in 2013
1. Afham Ramadhan (hiding Syaifudin Zuhri after 2009 bombs)
2. Dr Agus Purwantoro (Poso)
3. Ali Muhamad Akbar (Abu Umar)
4. Anif Solchanudin (Bali II)
5. Arif Syaifuddin (Abu Dujana)
6. Aris Widodo (Abu Dujana)
7. Arman alias Galaxi (Makassar)
8. Deni Carmelita (book bombs)
9. Eman Suherman (Aceh camp)
10. Hamid AgungWibowo (Aceh camp)
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11. Haris Amir Falah (JAT)
12. Hariyadi Usman (JAT)
13. Joko Daryono (Aceh camp)
14. Imam Mukhammad Firdaus (journalist who wanted scoop on book bombs)
15. Lilik Purnomo alias Haris (Poso beheading)
16. Mu’arifin
17. Muh. Fadil (book bombs)
18. Muthalib Patty (Ambon)
19. Nachrum Wali Sahalong (Ambon)
20. Nur Afifudin (helped hide Abu Dujana)
21. Rahmadi NowoKuncoro (Aceh camp)
22. Rahmadi Suheb (JI, Ambon)
23. Reza Sungkar alias Rizal Hasan (Aceh camp) 
24. Saefudin Zuhri alias Tsabit (assisted Noordin, links to Palembang group)
25. Santhanam (police poisoning plot)
26. Sonny Jayadi (helped hide Syaifudin Zuhri after 2009 bombs)
27. Supono alias Kedu (2009 hotel bombs)
28. Syarif Usman (JAT)
29. Umar bin Martini (police poisoning plot) 
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